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ABSTRACT
Performance appraisals in Australian universities – 




As a result of  federal government pressure in the late 1980’s Australian universities now ﬁ nd themselves embracing 
managerial practices at the expense of  their traditional collegial practices. The application of  managerialism into the 
university sector has seen the inculcation of  business practices, including the widespread application of  performance 
appraisals, into an environment which has in the past, been self-regulatory. Performance appraisals as a tool of  
managerialism, have provided university administrators with a mechanism which provides a sense of  compliance 
with private sector practices. But has it worked? This paper examines the nature of  performance appraisals and its 
usage within one university and questions how successful the introduction of  such practices has been. In doing so, 
it identiﬁ es areas of  further research.
Introduction
Historically, universities have been subjected to limited control by government. Since the late 1980’s 
however, universities in Australia have been put on notice by government: either align yourself  more to 
the interests and practices of  the business sector or suffer the ﬁ nancial consequences. In order to survive 
the crisis brought about by cutbacks to university funding, as well as to remain economically competitive in 
the global marketplace, universities have moved away from their traditional role to one more closely aligned 
to the business sector. With this alignment we have witnessed the inculcation of  business practices into 
academe. In this ‘new’ university, students are now viewed as ‘clients’, deans are regarded as ‘managers’ and 
knowledge is marketed as a commodity, to be bought and sold. One outcome of  this commercialisation 
of  education is that universities are now being subjected to ever increasing levels of  accountability, part 
of  which has involved the widespread application of  performance appraisal systems.
Performance appraisals which have a high degree of  social legitimacy because of  the implicit accountability 
factor, have been implanted into an environment which has in the past, been self-regulatory. This paper 
examines the nature of  performance appraisals and their value within one Australian university.
Performance appraisals and its critics
The performance of  work by employees has long been evaluated. Grint (1993) identiﬁ es performance 
appraisals going back to the 3rd century in China. Historically these performance appraisals were largely 
unsystematic, simple in their calculation and focused solely on the time, effort and resources expended by 
employees in the production of  output. Indeed, there have been attempts, over the last 100 years, to measure 
and control the work of  the academic through the use of  various forms of  inspection, quality control and 
payment by results but they have all failed dismally (Smyth 1989). The move to corporate managerialism 
comes straight out of  the nineteenth century and uses products or outcomes as the sole arbiters of  efﬁ ciency 
or effectiveness (Smyth 1989).
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In its contemporary application, performance appraisals have become more ambitious in range 
and expected beneﬁ ts. Performance appraisal is
 ‘… a process that identiﬁ es, evaluates and develops employee performance to meet employee 
and organizational goals… the appraiser identiﬁ es performance through observation and 
the collection of  performance-based information, evaluates this performance against set 
criteria and or indicators, and develops performance by eliminating performance problems, 
providing training and development activities and establishing higher goals ( Dessler, 
Grifﬁ ths, Lloyd-Walker & Williams, 1999:452).’
Unlike its predecessors, performance appraisals today are designed not only to account for current 
and foreseeable expenditure of  time, resources and effort but also encapsulate future goals and 
expectations of  both the organization and the individual. Despite the widely acclaimed beneﬁ ts of  
this new form of  performance appraisal, their value has been widely criticised. Newton and Findlay 
(1996) after a wide ranging study, concluded that performance appraisals rarely beneﬁ ted the 
individual. This was because they are predominantly concerned with surveillance, accountability 
and control. This view is echoed by Townley ( 1992) who believes that performance appraisals 
are a pseudo- scientiﬁ c management tool designed to manipulate and control staff. Performance 
appraisals, according to Grint (1993:69) are ﬂ awed because ‘they don’t so much discover the truth 
about the appraised, as construct it… In some cases the impact has been negative.’
In addition to these criticisms the process of  performance appraisals have also been criticised. 
(Grint 1993, Swan 1991, Cipolla & Trafford 1995, Stone 1998 and Longenecker & Gioia,1988). 
To these criticisms can be added the underlying assumption that the appraiser has the requisite 
skills and abilities to do it well. I think there is sufﬁ cient evidence in the literature to support a 
justiﬁ ed skepticism of  the utility of  performance appraisals. Given the wide ranging criticisms, 
one can only wonder if  Grint is perhaps understating the case when asserting of  performance 
appraisals that ‘rarely in the history of  business [has] such a system promised so much and 
delivered so little’ (1993:64).
The nature of  universities
Only the Church and the monarchy of  England have longer traditions than universities. Dating 
back to medieval times, European universities saw themselves distanced from the functional needs 
of  the society in which they operated. From this tradition has grown the belief  that universities 
are autonomous, liberal academies committed to independence, neutrality and the advancement 
of  knowledge without deference to politics or religion. Often referred to as an ‘ivory tower’, 
universities were seen to be impregnable to outside forces which might seek to inﬂ uence the role 
the university played in society. ‘The ivory tower… is more than a romantic ideal; it is at the core 
of  the academic value system and to a very large extent, represents our comparative advantage 
as truly independent institutions of  teaching and research’(Kearns 1998:154). 
The latter part of  the 20th century saw an erosion of  the ivory towers of  academe, globally. 
In Australia, it came about as a result of  Dawkins higher education policy reforms of  the early 
1990’s. Despite the fact that the federal government had no constitutional power over universities, 
by offering ‘tied grants’ to the states it effectively corralled universities under the direct control 
of  a central administration in Canberra. As a result of  the changes to the Australian university 
system, the work done by academics has undergone a shift away from the previous collegial 
model to a corporate-managerial model of  mission statements and performance management. 
In assessing these changes Mahony (1990) contends that these changes did considerable damage 
to the fabric of  the existing higher education system.
Dawkins’ proposals, represented a major shift from the state inﬂ uencing decisions about the 
nature of  educated labour to one of  the state controlling (under a good deal of  ﬁ nancial duress) 
decisions by individual educational providers about what counts as higher education (Smyth 1991). 
Part of  the reason for the introduction of  the new managerialist approach to higher education 
was the desire for accountability and predicatability. Smyth (1991) cites 4 examples as evidence 
of  moves to introduce ‘predictability’ into universities.
First the centralisation of  control in Canberra saw the move away from a collegiate model within 
universities in which decisions were made by groups of  peers engaged in robust argument. Second, 
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the desire by the central administration for ‘predictability’ saw the introduction of  performance 
appraisal systems in to universities. Third, the same bureaucratic desire for predictability saw 
a concomitant expansion in the size of  administrative cadres within universities, often at the 
expense of  teaching and research activities. Finally, the development of  redundancy procedures 
within universities enabled vice chancellors to disregard time-honoured tenure arrangements 
which had long been the backbone of  academic freedom. 
These changes were not unique to Australia. They were part of  a global trend where speciﬁ c social, 
economic and political agendas underpinned the emergence of  this new system of  managing 
universities. These agendas included the political priority to be economically competitive in the 
global marketplace. Universities were seen to be integral to the achievement of  these national 
goals. Managing universities therefore became a key priority for governments. This growing 
desire for control by the state over the university could be seen as evolving from two sources: 
the development of  the mass university and an unfavourable economic environment which 
necessitated government expenditure to be judiciously distributed and used to maximum effect 
(Neave, 1982). Within this climate we witnessed the subtle transformation of  universities; a 
transformation oriented to the marketplace. 
Locke (1990:8) refers to this trend in universities as signifying ‘the rise of  edubis’. He deﬁ nes 
“edubis” as an approach to managing the university as one which “assesses the value of  a university 
to society in ﬁ gures of  a balance sheet with the short term objective of  feeding its graduates 
into the job market”. He goes on to assert that the voice of  the university no longer represents 
values of  academe but rather the values of  business and business leaders and this importation of  
ideas is leading to a decline in both academic inﬂ uence and in ethical standards. The inculcation 
of  business practices into academia has also imbedded new criteria for measuring and assessing 
academic work. In this environment, ‘efﬁ ciency’, ‘accountability’ and ‘productivity’ are directly 
linked to deﬁ ned and targeted markets for academic courses. While corporate managerial practices 
may deliver signiﬁ cant cost efﬁ ciencies to the university, managerialism comes at a signiﬁ cant 
cost, particularly for those academics with a strong sense of  professional identity (Nixon, 1996). 
It has caused major problems for academics for whom a different logic drives their behaviour.
 “The universities institutional logic - the ideal liberal academy- is one of  resistance to the needs 
of  the State and the criteria of  the marketplace in shaping the organisation and the conduct of  
learning” (Townley 1997:276). This institutional logic is reinforced by academic work which is 
highly discretionary, deﬁ nes and implements its own goals, sets performance standards and sees 
those standards are maintained. Over generations, universities have therefore generated a rationale 
for how professionals should be managed. They have developed a resistance to interference by 
external sources particularly when it threatens their independence. For these reasons academics, 
anecdotally, view performance appraisals as threatening their professional discretion and expertise 
as well as introducing a degree of  standardisation and rationalisation to their work.
 Academics derive high levels of  satisfaction and motivation from both the intrinsic rewards of  
their job and their perceptions of  academic freedom, freedom in which to create and disseminate 
knowledge (Adams, 1998). Introducing managerialism in to this environment, may deliver some 
economic beneﬁ ts but one adverse consequence might be academics exhibiting low levels of  
commitment to their organisation as a result of  the perceived organisational rigidity and a culture 
of  stiﬂ ed learning and creativity (Winter et al., 2000).
There is an interesting dichotomy taking place in universities. As universities research and teach 
about the changing nature of  organisations today they are in fact watching themselves move in 
the opposite direction. Despite the fact that many organisations are deserting Tayloristic principles 
and turning towards more worker-participative procedures, higher education is being forced to 
desert its collaborative and collegial model and move towards a management structure which bares 
an unhealthy resemblance to the ideas of  Frederick Winslow Taylor. Today increased managerial 
control is well advanced under the guise of  restoring international competitiveness. Academic 
skills are becoming increasingly isolated and fragmented to make the work more speciﬁ c and 
therefore more easily codiﬁ ed and measured for performance appraisals. Idealogical control of  
the work of  the academic is shifting to one of  technical control over contexts that are framed 
by the norms and values of  business (Smyth & Hattam 2000). 
Performance appraisals in Australian universities – imposing a managerialistic framework into a collegial culture
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How has this shift in control happened? In the past university administrators were often 
distinguished academics who not only understood the history but the role of  the university. In the 
corporatised university of  today, administrators are just that, administrators. They are professional 
managers who see their role as applying business principles to every element of  the university 
and measuring their success in terms of  technical efﬁ ciency alone. Most administrators would 
acknowledge that universities are complex organisations. Part of  this complexity comes from 
the varying focii that universities have in terms of  research and teaching. Even in one a single 
university, research and teaching attached to different disciplines, require different organisation 
and support. How naïve it is to think that the uniformity and line control evident in business 
or industrial organisations can be applied to universities and not diminish creative or academic 
productivity. One could ask why does it appear that academics have been complicit in the move 
to a managerialistic environment? The answer lies in the fact that the commodiﬁ cation of  higher 
education has become so imbedded in university culture and been part of  the professional 
discourse to such an extent that many academics may not readily realise the extent to which they 
are implicated (Nixon et al., 2001).
Universities and performance appraisals
Universities are now under immense pressure to generate increasing portions of  their own income. 
As has been identiﬁ ed, this has resulted in a reorientation of  traditional management practices 
to one that has seen universities engage with business more intimately and in doing so replicate 
many of  its management practices. The widespread adoption of  performance appraisals in the 
university sector has been one such practice. The introduction of  performance appraisals into 
universities is driven by the perception that not only will it provide predictability it will also provide 
accountability. In countering that argument, Stone (1998:265) says that ‘not only is there a belief  
that performance appraisals are not appropriate for academics, they are also seen as an attack on 
academic freedom as well as a potential tool to monitor and control staff, preventing unpopular 
research or discussion not popular with the university.’ Lonsdale (1998:303) supports Stone’s 
position. ‘Past approaches to …appraisal and performance management in higher education have 
had limited and confused purposes and their contribution to enhanced institutional performance 
and quality has been minimal.’ 
Generally speaking, performance appraisals serve 4 key functions ; to assist with compensation, 
promotion, training and performance feedback. Davidson & Grifﬁ n (2003), Henderson (1997), 
Jones, George &Hill (2000) Robbins (1997) Scarpello &Ledvinka (1988), Hind & Baruch (1997). 
More speciﬁ cally, performance appraisals, 
 …increase motivation, foster productivity, improve communications, encourage employee 
growth and development and help solve work related performance problems. In addition 
it can provide a systematic basis for compensation, promotion, transfer, termination and 
training and development (Longenecker & Gioia 1988:41).
Using one university as a case in point, this paper considers how well these diverse expectations 
of  performance appraisal are realised within the academic environment. 
Are performance appraisals used for determining individual forms of  remuneration amongst 
academic staff  ? The answer is no. The university sector is covered by the National Tertiary 
Education Union (NTEU) which negotiates on behalf  of  all academic employees certiﬁ ed 
agreements with individual universities. The wages and conditions of  academics are therefore 
determined on a collective basis and make no reference to the outcomes of  individual performance 
appraisals. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future as the NTEU has a long held 
belief  that performance-based pay schemes are merely devises seeking to intensify the work 
effort and increase the control of  management” (Stone 1998:265). A critical factor that Bryman, 
Haslam & Webb (1994) identiﬁ ed in their study of  British universities was the recognition of  the 
importance of  organisations implementing appraisal recommendations. In acknowledging the 
failure of  universities to implement appraisal outcomes they argue that it was not necessarily a 
result of  indifference on the part of  appraisers or universities but rather an inability to resource 
the range of  outcomes identiﬁ ed in the performance appraisals. This failure to implement appraisal 
outcomes, for what ever reason, has the potential to jeopardise the whole appraisal system. This 
applies equally to Australian universities as it does to UK ones. 
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The recession of  the late 1980’s and early 1990’s changed the dynamics and value of  performance 
appraisals in business organisations (Kennedy 1999). A good performance appraisal didn’t 
necessarily mean more money. Weren’t employees lucky to still have a job? “Once organisations 
began to disconnect raises from performance the appraisal process was on the ropes. Not 
only did the connection between reviews and rewards suffer but as organisations ﬂ attened, the 
connection between reviews and promotions diminished as well” (Kennedy 1999:51). If  the 
appraisal process was ‘on the ropes’ when organisations disconnected raises from performance 
appraisals, how then does academia in Australia fair when there has never been that connection?
Are performance appraisals in universities used to determine directly, who should be promoted? 
At the university in question, the answer is no. Most Australian academics are paid and promoted 
on a four grades scale – Grade A (associate lecturer), Grade B (lecturer) Grade C ( senior lecturer) 
Grade D (associate professor). Within grades A-C there are a number of  levels. In academia, 
promotions occur when an individual has reached the top of  the scale for their grade. Even then 
promotion is not automatic, and is usually based on certain research, teaching and administrative 
criteria being achieved to the satisfaction of  the promotion panel. The actual performance 
appraisal plays a very small role, if  any, in determining whether someone is promoted to the next 
level. Once an academic has reached the next level they climb the incremental ladder without 
deference to the performance appraisal which is carried out annually. So it does not matter 
whether the academic is the best or worst researcher or teacher, there is very little direct link 
between pay, performance and promotion.
Given that one of  the key functions of  performance appraisal is to identify training needs, is this 
reﬂ ected in academia? Again, in the university in question, the answer is no. In the pursuit of  
achieving organisational goals one would expect the universities to be highly active and ﬁ nancially 
forthcoming in allowing academic staff  time off  and funding their training deﬁ cits. Such is rarely 
the case. When it does occur, for example, it is usually training related to the introduction of  new 
information technology, and is typically undertaken regardless of  performance appraisals. The 
training necessary to be promoted from one grade to the next typically involves more time and 
resources than most universities are prepared to provide. The acquisition of  PhD’s are usually 
undertaken at the personal prerogative of  the academic rather than to satisfy a measurement 
standard in a performance appraisal. The issue of  teaching skills is rarely identiﬁ ed in performance 
appraisals and is usually covered in the probationary period of  an academic’s appointment and are 
no longer an issue once the academic moves from the probationary period. Annual performance 
appraisals then become at best, the opportunity to ask for some minor training – often computer 
related - and usually with no direct link to pay or promotions. 
Do academics get performance feedback in their performance appraisals? Yes they do but, “…in 
a performance oriented company there is no room for egalitarianism. Inadequate performance 
cannot be tolerated… employees who achieve want to be recognised and rewarded for their 
efforts. To motivate performance, outstanding performers must be identiﬁ ed and rewarded 
accordingly” (Stone 1991:150). Unless managers have a range of  options to access after 
performance appraisals, then the value of  performance appraisals to the organisation is limited. 
In the egalitarian conﬁ nes of  academia, the value of  performance appraisals is almost neglible. 
For over a 100 years in education there have been attempts to measure and control the work of  
the academic through the use of  various forms of  inspection, quality control and payment by 
results but they have all failed dismally (Smyth 1989).
Smyth (1989) sees collegiality as a counter discourse to managerialism and with that goes the 
implicit arguments against performance appraisals. First he argues, the basis of  collegiality is 
one of  sharing, trust and participation compared with distrust, control and retribution. Second, 
collegiality in universities has a different tenet to management and control. It is about individuals 
who share and ‘connect’ with one another and everyone is aware of  that connectedness ie 
those who do the work have the responsibility for assessing the work and making judgements 
about its worthwhileness. “Collegial judgements…are no less rigorous than highly quantitative, 




Performance appraisals as a tool of  managerialism, have provided university administrators 
with a mechanism which provides a sense of  compliance with private sector practices, internal 
accountability and control in addition to a means to standardise and rationalise behaviour. Given 
the apparent ﬂ aws inherent in performance appraisals universities would be better placed to 
focus on what they had; a model which was highly participatory in nature, reﬂ ected the culture 
and environment in which it operated, was no less rigorous in its intent and which had served 
the academic community well in the past. 
However, while there is extensive research regarding performance appraisals in private sector 
workplaces, the empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of  performance appraisals in academia, 
is silent. While this paper has presented one position regarding the applicability of  performance 
appraisals in academia it has also identiﬁ ed the paucity of  empirical research in this speciﬁ c area. 
Hopefully this paper has provided a platform for further examination of  performance appraisals 
in the academic environment.
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